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1 
CASTING SHADOWS: FISHER v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN 
AND THE MISPLACED FEAR OF “TOO MUCH” DIVERSITY 
SUSANNAH W. POLLVOGT∗ 
Well, I thought that the whole purpose of affirmative action was to 
help students who come from underprivileged backgrounds, but you 
make a very different argument that I don’t think I’ve ever seen 
before.1  -Justice Alito 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Justice Alito’s comment, made during the recent oral argument 
before the Supreme Court of the United States in Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin,2 is troubling on many levels.  Significantly, the 
comment suggests that Justice Alito has not recently reread Regents of 
the University of California v. Bakke3 or Grutter v. Bollinger4—the two 
Supreme Court decisions that will likely control the outcome in Fisher.  
Bakke and Grutter acknowledged two possible justifications for race-
conscious admissions policies, and the justification these cases 
ultimately endorse is the one Justice Alito appears to be unfamiliar 
with. 
Specifically, per Bakke and Grutter, the two possible bases for the 
use of race-conscious admissions policies are: (1) remedial 
justifications and (2) educational excellence justifications.5 Remedial 
justifications posit that, because past race discrimination in 
admissions decisions limited the number of racial minorities who had 
access to higher education, race-conscious admissions policies are 
needed today to bolster the number of students of color in student 
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 1.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 43, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 
(U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012). 
 2.  No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012). 
 3.  438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion). 
 4.  539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 5.  See id. at 328 (comparing remedial justifications and educational justifications for 
race-conscious admissions policies). 
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bodies, and thereby overcome historical deficits.6  Justice Alito 
focused on this type of remedial justification when he characterized 
the purpose of such policies as “help[ing] students who come from 
underprivileged backgrounds.”7 
Justifications based in educational excellence work quite 
differently.  Educational excellence justifications are premised on the 
notion that background-conscious—including race-conscious—
admissions policies allow school administrators to compose diverse 
student bodies that are more likely to espouse diverse viewpoints, 
which will in turn support robust academic conversations and 
intellectual environments.8 
Justice Alito’s comment is curious because the remedial 
justifications he implied are at issue in Fisher were rejected soundly 
over thirty years ago in Bakke.9  His comment is also curious because 
the “very different argument” Justice Alito did not think he had “seen 
before” was the educational excellence justification the Court 
explicitly endorsed as constitutionally sound in Bakke, and later 
reaffirmed in Grutter.10 
Because the Court has endorsed the educational excellence 
justification for race-conscious admissions policies on two occasions, it 
is surprising that Justice Alito purported to be unfamiliar with that 
justification.  But Justice Alito’s confusion in fact represents a larger 
confusion on the Court—one that was apparent at oral argument in 
Fisher and can be traced back to passages in the Grutter decision 
itself—about the relationship between remedial and educational 
excellence justifications for race-conscious admissions policies.  It is as 
if certain members of the Court cannot accept the notion that 
                                                          
 6.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369 (Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., concurring 
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that “race-conscious admissions 
criteria” can be used to remedy past discrimination). 
 7.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 43. 
 8.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329–30 (describing the educational justifications for race-
conscious admissions policies). 
 9.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (stating that granting additional rights to groups 
“perceived as victims of ‘societal discrimination’” as a privilege was not justified and has 
never been approved by the Supreme Court). 
 10.  Justice Alito’s comment was in response to an argument by counsel for the 
University of Texas that admitting minority candidates under the school’s affirmative 
action policy “directly impacts the educational benefits of diversity.”  Transcript of Oral 
Argument, supra note 1, at 42.  This argument echoed the sentiments of Bakke and Grutter.  
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311–12 (referring to “the attainment of a diverse student body” as “a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education”); Grutter, 539 U.S. 
at 328 (deferring to the school’s judgment that “diversity will . . . yield educational 
benefits”). 
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promoting diversity is not necessarily about “us” (the presumptive 
gatekeepers of access to cultural capital) helping “them” 
(disadvantaged people of color), but instead about a unified effort to 
create an environment of academic excellence that benefits all 
members of the community. 
The Court has the opportunity to sort out this confusion through 
its forthcoming decision in Fisher. 
II.  ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE IN BAKKE 
In his 1978 plurality opinion in Bakke, Justice Powell made a 
strong case for the fundamental importance of educational diversity 
to the mission of academia.11  At issue in Bakke was the 
constitutionality of the admissions policy employed by the Medical 
School of the University of California at Davis (“U.C. Davis”).12  It is 
important to note that the type of policy at issue in Bakke was entirely 
different than the type of policy at issue in Grutter and Fisher.  Under 
the Grutter and Fisher policies, admissions decisions were made by 
considering race as one factor in a holistic assessment of admissions 
applications.13  By contrast, the U.C. Davis policy called for a very 
blunt “set-aside” mechanism that reserved a certain number of slots in 
the incoming class for racial minorities.14 
Because the policy in Bakke relied on facial race classifications, 
Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny,15 which required U.C. Davis to 
prove that the policy served a compelling interest, and that race 
classifications were necessary to achieve that interest.16 
Addressing the first prong of strict-scrutiny review, U.C. Davis 
offered four interests in support of the policy:  
                                                          
 11.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312–14 (discussing the notion of academic freedom and 
explaining how diversity furthers the goals of academia). 
 12.  Id. at 269–70. 
 13.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 315–16; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 218 (5th 
Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
 14.  See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275–76 (describing how U.C. Davis reserved a “prescribed 
number” of admissions slots for “special applicants,” all of whom turned out to be 
members of racial minority groups); see also id. at 348–49 (Brennan, White, Marshall & 
Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting the use 
of the term “‘set-aside’” to describe a racial quota system in a federal law regarding grants 
for public works (quoting 123 Cong. Rec. 5,327 (1977))). 
 15.  Id. at 289–91. 
 16.  See id. at 299 (“When [political judgments] touch upon an individual’s race or 
ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked 
to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”). 
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(i) “reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored 
minorities in medical schools and in the medical 
profession,”; (ii) countering the effects of societal 
discrimination; (iii) increasing the number of physicians 
who will practice in communities currently underserved; and 
(iv) obtaining the educational benefits that flow from an 
ethnically diverse student body.17 
Justice Powell rejected the first goal—reaching a certain 
numerical representation of minority students—as “facially invalid,” 
describing preference for one group over another based only on race 
or ethnicity as “discrimination for its own sake.”18 
He also rejected the second goal—countering the effects of past 
discrimination—as insufficiently precise: 
[T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty 
of the Davis Medical School perceived as victims of “societal 
discrimination” does not justify a classification that imposes 
disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no 
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the 
special admissions program are thought to have suffered.  
To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore 
reserved for violations of legal rights into a privilege that all 
institutions throughout the Nation could grant at their 
pleasure to whatever groups are perceived as victims of 
societal discrimination.19 
Regarding the third goal—increasing the number of physicians 
in underserved communities—Justice Powell determined that the 
school had failed to show racial preferences were necessary to achieve 
that goal.20 
Thus, the only governmental interest Justice Powell found 
sufficiently compelling was the fourth goal—“attain[ing] . . . a diverse 
student body,”21—which he characterized as “clearly . . . a 
constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher 
education.”22  Justice Powell further emphasized that this interest was 
grounded in weighty First Amendment freedoms: 
                                                          
 17.  Id. at 305–06 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 
32, Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (No. 76-811)). 
 18.  Id. at 307. 
 19.  Id. at 310. 
 20.  Id. at 310–11. 
 21.  Id. at 311. 
 22.  Id. at 311–12. 
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Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated 
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special 
concern of the First Amendment.  The freedom of a 
university to make its own judgments as to education 
includes the selection of its student body. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  Thus, in arguing that its universities must be accorded 
the right to select those students who will contribute the 
most to the “robust exchange of ideas,” petitioner invokes a 
countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First 
Amendment.  In this light, petitioner must be viewed as 
seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in 
the fulfillment of its mission.23 
Because Justice Powell identified a state interest sufficient to 
justify the law, he went on to the second prong of strict-scrutiny 
analysis: an examination of whether the policy was narrowly tailored 
to serve that interest.24  He concluded that the strict numerical set-
aside for minority students was too blunt an instrument to meet the 
narrow-tailoring standard.25  Justice Powell offered that it would be 
permissible, by contrast, for the school to consider race as one factor 
among many in an individualized assessment of applicants.26  And 
going forward, schools began constructing their admissions policies in 
precisely this manner. 
Although the Bakke decision was only a plurality opinion, it holds 
an important place in the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence 
because it stated unequivocally that generalized remedial justifications 
could not support race-conscious admissions policies.  Only 
educational excellence justifications, with their grounding in the First 
Amendment, were sufficiently compelling. 
III.  GRUTTER AND THE SEEDS OF CONFUSION 
Twenty-five years later, the majority in Grutter validated the core 
conclusion of Justice Powell’s plurality decision in Bakke: Promoting a 
diverse educational environment is a compelling state interest for 
                                                          
 23.  Id. at 312–13. 
 24.  See id. at 314–15 (“[T]he question remains whether the program’s racial 
classification is necessary to promote this interest.”). 
 25.  See id. at 315 (reasoning that by focusing exclusively on race and ethnicity, the 
university’s policy would frustrate, rather than promote, true diversity). 
 26.  Id. at 317–19. 
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purposes of strict scrutiny review.27  The Grutter Court also confirmed 
the Bakke plurality’s assertion that using race as one factor in a holistic 
assessment of a candidate can satisfy strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring 
requirement.28  But the Grutter Court went further than to reaffirm 
Bakke. The Grutter Court added the requirement that, in order to be 
narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions policy must be time-
limited.29  The current confusion in Fisher arises from this problematic 
time-limitation requirement. 
At issue in Grutter was the admissions policy of the University of 
Michigan Law School.30  That policy self-consciously sought to comply 
with Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke by using race as only one factor 
in a holistic assessment of each individual candidate.31  Further, the 
school asserted only one state interest in support of the policy: 
enhancing educational diversity as described by Justice Powell in 
Bakke.32 
The Grutter Court approved the school’s compelling interest in 
educational excellence and its narrowly tailored approach to 
achieving that goal, essentially reaching the same result based on the 
same reasoning the Bakke Court would have reached had Michigan 
Law School’s policy been before it. 
But the Grutter Court went further.  Specifically, the Court 
disaggregated race as a component of the diversity that supports 
educational excellence, and subjected the inclusion of race to yet 
another layer of scrutiny.33  Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
recognized the current salience of race to maintaining a diversity of 
viewpoints, but then characterized this relevance as unfortunate and 
necessarily time limited: “Just as growing up in a particular region or 
having particular professional experiences is likely to affect an 
individual’s views, so too is one’s own, unique experience of being a 
racial minority in a society, like our own, in which race unfortunately 
still matters.”34 
                                                          
 27.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003). 
 28.  See id. at 334  (“Universities can . . . consider race or ethnicity . . . flexibly as a 
‘plus’ factor in the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”). 
 29.  Id. at 342. 
 30.  Id. at 311. 
 31.  Id. at 314. 
 32.  Id. at 328. 
 33.  See id. at 341–42 (examining race as an element of diversity and determining that 
there must be durational limits to race-conscious policies). 
 34.  Id. at 333. 
 2012] “TOO MUCH” DIVERSITY 7 
From this unexamined normative assumption that race should 
not “matter” as an aspect of identity, and the related assumption that, 
as we progress as a society, race will inevitably cease to matter, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that “race-conscious admissions policies must 
be limited in time.”35  She even went so far as to speculate that such 
policies would be unnecessary in twenty-five years.36 
There are several problems with the analysis employed to support 
the time-limitation requirement.  First, it is based in impressionistic 
claims about social reality that are generally beyond judicial 
competence.37  Second, the twin claims that (1) in an ideal world, 
race would not matter, and (2) we are progressing toward such a 
world because race discrimination itself is in a state of inevitable 
decline, are both highly contested and contestable.38  Under this 
analysis, race matters only because it is and has been an axis of 
discrimination.  This seems wrong, and even patently offensive. 
Further, by relying on these problematic assumptions, Justice 
O’Connor’s analysis fails to apprehend the value and purpose of 
educational excellence as a justification for race-conscious admissions 
policies, as set forth by Justice Powell in Bakke.  Justice Powell 
strenuously emphasized the distinction between remedial 
justifications for race-conscious admissions policies on the one hand, 
which are aimed at absolving the sins of past discrimination, and 
educational excellence justifications on the other hand, which are 
forward-looking and not dependent on assertions about a social 
reality of race subordination (or the supposedly inevitable dissolution 
of such subordination).  Pursuant to an educational excellence 
                                                          
 35.  Id. at 342.  Justice O’Connor then described how a time limit could be 
implemented: “In the context of higher education, the durational requirement can be met 
by sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic reviews to 
determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to achieve student body diversity.”  
Id. 
 36.  See id. at 343 (“We expect that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will 
no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”). 
 37.  Justice Powell himself made a related point about the Court’s limited ability to 
judge the relative political and social position of various groups in society: “The kind of 
variable sociological and political analysis necessary to produce such rankings [of the 
relative hardships borne by different racial groups] simply does not lie within the judicial 
competence—even if they otherwise were politically feasible and socially desirable.”  
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 297 (1978). 
 38.  See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Role of Race in Jury Impartiality and Venue Transfers, 53 
MD. L. REV. 107, 150 (1994) (noting that while some scholars argue an ideal society will be 
colorblind, other scholars “stand in opposition to the theory of colorblindness”); David 
Kairys, Unconscious Racism, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 857, 861 (2011) (arguing that despite changes 
in how racism is perceived in the United States, “[d]eep-seated notions about race dating 
back to slavery, Jim Crow, and segregation persisted and remain very much alive today”). 
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justification, one assumes that the school seeking to diversify its 
student body is in the best position to assess the type and degree of 
diversity that should be cultivated at any point in time, in order to 
maximize educational benefits at that school.  In recognition of 
limited judicial competence, the Court should defer to such fact-
specific, context-dependent judgments.39 
Justice O’Connor added the time-limitation requirement based 
on the assumptions that race discrimination will inevitably fade away, 
and with it, the relevance of race as an aspect of identity.  Putting 
aside this pie-in-the-sky prediction about the future of race 
discrimination in the United States, and the offensive assertion that 
race only “matters” because it is a basis for discrimination, the 
problem with Justice O’Connor’s analysis is that it conflates the 
remedial and educational excellence justifications that Justice Powell 
took great pains to distinguish. 
IV.  MANIFESTATIONS OF CONFUSION IN FISHER 
The Court’s confusion about the distinction between remedial 
and academic excellence justifications then manifested during the 
oral arguments in Fisher. 
The policy of the University of Texas at Austin (“U.T. Austin” or 
“University”) at issue in Fisher bears a striking resemblance to the 
admissions policy validated in Grutter, in part because U.T. Austin 
carefully patterned its policy on Supreme Court precedent.40  
Specifically, for a certain portion of the applicant pool, U.T. Austin 
considers not only an applicant’s Academic Index, but also an 
applicant’s Personal Achievement Index, which is meant to account 
for individual qualities that would not otherwise be considered if 
assessment of the candidate were limited to the Academic Index 
                                                          
 39.  Justice O’Connor addressed this concept in an earlier part of her majority opinion 
in Grutter, prior to addressing durational limits:  
Our scrutiny of [Michigan Law School’s interest in diversity] is no less strict for 
taking into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily 
within the expertise of the university.  Our holding today is in keeping with our 
tradition of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, 
within constitutionally prescribed limits. 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.  In Fisher, the plaintiff argued that such deference to a university’s 
judgments does not comport with strict scrutiny review.  See Brief for Petitioner at 53, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 11-345 (U.S. May 21, 2012) (arguing that the Court 
“should expressly clarify or overrule Grutter . . . to . . . restore the integrity of strict scrutiny 
review in the higher educational setting”). 
 40.  Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 216 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012). 
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alone.41  The Personal Achievement Index is based on a holistic 
assessment of each applicant’s file.42  This assessment also considers 
“‘special circumstances,’” which may include socioeconomic status 
and race, among various other factors.43  This aspect of the admissions 
policy operates in conjunction with a “Top Ten Percent Law,” under 
which all Texas applicants graduating within the top ten percent of 
their high school class are guaranteed admission to U.T. Austin.44  
The Top Ten Percent Law, which contains no facial race 
classification, has been the primary factor in increasing racial diversity 
within the UT Austin student body.45 
As described above, subjecting a law or policy to strict scrutiny 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the U.S. Constitution involves a two-prong analysis.  First, a court 
determines whether the challenged law or policy serves a compelling 
state interest; second, the court determines whether the mechanism 
employed by the law or policy is narrowly tailored to serve that 
compelling interest.46  In Fisher, it was uncontested that U.T. Austin’s 
race-conscious undergraduate admissions policy (1) serves the 
acknowledged compelling state interest in student-body diversity and 
(2) serves this interest in a manner that complies with Grutter.47 
On what basis, then, did Fisher challenge U.T. Austin’s policy?  
Not surprisingly, Fisher’s argument capitalizes on the doctrinally 
ambiguous time limitation requirement announced in Grutter.  
Specifically, Fisher argued that U.T. Austin had to demonstrate that a 
race-conscious admissions policy is still necessary today to achieve 
student-body diversity in order to prove that its policy was narrowly 
tailored, or necessary, to achieve the compelling state interest in 
educational diversity.48  This argument is essentially an end-run 
                                                          
 41.  Id. at 227–28. 
 42.  Id. at 228. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 224. 
 45.  See id. at 261 (Garza, J., concurring) (noting that a much higher percentage of 
minority students were admitted as a result of Top Ten Percent Law than the Personal 
Achievement Index). 
 46.  See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 47.  See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 230 (“UT [Austin] undoubtedly has a compelling interest in 
obtaining the educational benefits of diversity, and its reasons for implementing race-
conscious admissions . . . mirror those approved by the Supreme Court in Grutter.”). 
 48.  To show that the use of racial classifications is necessary, petitioner argued that: 
UT [Austin] also must demonstrate that its use of race in admissions is 
“necessary to further” an unmet compelling government interest. . . . UT [Austin] 
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around the precedent established in Grutter because it requires 
schools to prove that diversity, including racial diversity, remains a 
compelling state interest on an ongoing basis, while cloaking the attack 
as an argument under the narrow-tailoring prong of strict scrutiny. 
Having framed the issue in this manner, Fisher then argued that 
the race-conscious component of UT Austin’s admissions policy was 
no longer necessary because the Top Ten Percent Law had succeeded 
in increasing racial diversity within the student body, thereby 
obviating the need for a separate race-conscious diversity program.49  
This argument resulted in the following opening passage in the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision in Fisher, which is humming with anxiety that U.T. 
Austin might one day be home to “too much” diversity: 
While the University has confined its explicit use of race to 
the elements of a program approved by the Supreme Court 
in Grutter v. Bollinger, UT [Austin]’s program acts upon a 
university applicant pool shaped by a legislatively[ 
]mandated parallel diversity initiative that guarantees 
admission to Texas students in the top ten percent of their 
high school class.  The ever-increasing number of minorities 
gaining admission under this Top Ten Percent Law casts a 
shadow on the horizon to the otherwise-plain legality of the 
Grutter-like admissions program . . . .50 
Thus, the only basis for challenging U.T. Austin’s precedent-
compliant policy was the fear that, when combined with the successful 
Top Ten Percent Law, the University might be creating excessive 
diversity. 
This anxiety about excessive diversity was echoed at oral 
argument before the Supreme Court.  Questioning from a number of 
Justices had a distinct “are we there yet?” quality.  For instance, the 
Justices pressed counsel for both parties to identify a number or 
percentage of minority students that would satisfy the critical mass 
requirement.51  Justice Scalia was fixated on how U.T. Austin 
                                                          
thus needed a strong factual basis that the student body did not already include the 
“meaningful number” of minority students needed to meet an educational goal 
in student-body diversity before restoring race into its admissions system. 
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 39, at 31 (emphasis added). 
 49.  Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 50–51, Fisher, 631 F.3d 213 (No. 09-50822). 
 50.  Fisher, 631 F.3d at 216–17 (footnote omitted). 
 51.  Early in the argument, for example, Justice Sotomayor pressed Fisher’s counsel: 
So could you tell me what a critical mass was?  I’m looking at the number of 
blacks in the University of Texas system.  Pre-Grutter, when the state was 
indisputably still segregating, it was 4 percent.  Today, under the post-Grutter 
system, it’s 6 percent.  The 2 percent increase is enough for you, even though 
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determined whether there were “enough” minorities in any given 
class.52  In this way, the Justices backed UT Austin into a doctrinal 
corner.  If the University were to admit that it was assessing sufficient 
diversity against a numerical standard, it would be admitting to 
relying on unconstitutional quotas.  Counsel for U.T. Austin resisted 
the Court’s efforts to characterize the policy in this manner, stressing 
that race was only one component of the diversity the University 
sought, and that the need for diversity was assessed in a nuanced 
manner.53 
At the end of the day, the concern that a school might achieve 
too much diversity does not fit well with the educational excellence 
justification endorsed in Bakke and purportedly reaffirmed—albeit in 
a confused way—in Grutter.  Because this concern assumes that, once 
some quantifiable “critical mass” of minority students has been 
reached, the need for schools to consciously construct diverse student 
bodies will disappear.  Under an educational excellence justification, 
by contrast, we would assume that schools are free to continuously 
reassess their diversity needs and refine their admissions policies to 
achieve optimal student-body compositions.  And schools should be 
permitted to include consideration of race in this analysis, so long as 
race still “matters” as a part of identity. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In deciding Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,54 the Court 
should strive to craft a rule for all time—a rule that affords 
universities sufficient latitude to assemble robust, diverse student 
bodies in the face of our ever-changing, pluralistic society.  But based 
                                                          
the state population is at 12 percent?  Somehow, they’ve reached a critical mass 
with just the 2 percent increase? 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 14; see also id. at 16–17 (asking Fisher’s 
counsel to define the point at which “a district court or a university know[s] that it doesn’t 
have to do any more to equalize the desegregation that has happened in that particular 
state over decades”); id. at 49 (asking counsel for U.T. Austin about the point at which the 
Court should “stop deferring to the University’s judgment that race is still necessary”); id. 
at 46–47 (asking counsel for U.T. Austin when the Court will know that the University has 
“reached a critical mass”). 
 52.  Id. at 34.  Justice Scalia was also concerned with what resources the University 
might be spending to gather this information, evoking an image of a vast cadre of 
affirmative action officers swarming the U.T. Austin campus to monitor sufficient levels of 
racial diversity in every classroom.  See id. (“[S]omebody walks in the room and looks [the 
students] over to see . . . who looks Asian, who looks black, who looks Hispanic?  Is that . . . 
how it’s done?”). 
 53.  Id. at 39–40. 
 54.  No. 11-345 (U.S. argued Oct. 10, 2012). 
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on the dialogue initiated by the Justices during the Fisher oral 
argument, the Court appears headed in a different direction.  In a 
sense, the Court seems to be stuck in time—specifically, in a mythical 
time where we have ended the social practices that suppress diversity 
in powerful institutions, such that these institutions no longer need to 
remedy the lingering harms of past discrimination.  There is plenty 
with which to argue in this premise itself, but what is most important 
is that it entirely misses the point.  Per the Court’s own precedent, 
diversity-enhancing admissions policies are desirable not because they 
supposedly cure the ills of particular past instances of discrimination, 
but because they foster vibrant intellectual environments—the goal of 
every academic institution in selecting students for admission. 
